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Restoring the Balance of Power: The
Struggle for Control of the Supreme Court
By TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI*
I. Introduction
Recent years have been exciting for scholars studying the Supreme
Court and the judicial selection process. In 1987, the Senate decisively
rejected President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork after a particu-
larly intense and divisive confirmation battle. Douglas Ginsburg, Bork's
replacement, withdrew his nomination after revelations of marijuana use.
Anthony Kennedy and David Souter then sailed through the confirma-
tion process despite (and probably because of) a near total absence of
knowledge regarding their political and judicial philosophies. The nomi-
nation and near rejection of Clarence Thomas defies such simplistic char-
acterization, though perhaps "bizarre" says it best.
These events are rich in intellectual opportunities for students of the
judicial selection process. They may, for example, be used as vehicles for
examining the criteria which the Senate may properly use in appraising a
Supreme Court nominee,' evaluating presidential strategy in selecting a
nominee and securing confirmation,2 or analyzing the degree to which
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara University. Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley, 1990; M.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1981; B.G.S., University
of Kansas, 1979. For his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, the author
wishes to thank Robert Kagan of the University of California, Berkeley.
1. See, eg., Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REv.
672 (1989); Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and Con-
sent, JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS (1990); Gary J. Simson, Taking
the Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees,
7 CONST. COMMENTARY 283 (1990); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992); Nina Totenberg, The
Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1213
(1988); "What's the Alternative?"." A Roundtable on the Confirmation Process, 78 A.B.A. J. 41
(Jan. 1992).
2. See JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESI-
DENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS (1990); Charles
Cameron, et al., Supreme Court Nominations and the Rational Presidency, Paper presented at
the American Political Science Association meeting, Sept. 1, 1990 (on file with the author).
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the selection process is undergoing significant change.3
The purpose of this particular effort is to reassess the selection pro-
cess as a satisfactory vehicle of constitutional change, regarding the
proper balance of power between the President and Congress. As an em-
pirical matter, constitutional change has occurred more frequently
through appointments to the Court than through the amendment pro-
cess.4 Recently, we have seen a marked effort by several presidents to
transform constitutional law doctrines through a succession of conserva-
tive appointments. Thus, the adequacy of the judicial selection process
as a mechanism for debating and approving constitutional change is an
especially critical and timely issue.
The starting point for this analysis is a 1988 Harvard Law Review
article by Professor Bruce Ackerman regarding the failed Bork nomina-
tion.5 Ackerman argued that there are significant risks involved in rely-
ing on "transformative appointments" to the Supreme Court as the
primary way to effect constitutional change. As a result, he called for
reform of the constitutional amendment process. While Professor Ack-
erman accurately assessed the potential risks of transformative appoint-
ments, his reform proposal was misdirected, ineffective, and impractical.
The primary danger of transformative appointments is that presi-
dents may succeed in enacting significant change in constitutional law
through their appointments to the Supreme Court without the broad and
deep political support which should be required for such change in a
democracy. Reform efforts, then, should focus not on the constitutional
amendment process, but rather on strengthening the political checks on
presidential power to control the Court's composition and ideological
make-up. Before examining how this might be accomplished, it will be
useful to examine Ackerman's alternate approach to the problem.
II. The Virtues and Vices of Transformative Appointments
In Professor Ackerman's view, the defeat, indeed humiliation, of
Judge Bork at the hands of the Senate was "tragic."6 Robert Bork sur-
passed most Supreme Court nominees in terms of his intellect, profes-
sional accomplishments, as well as his serious and extended examination
3. See Mark Silverstein & William Haltom, Can There Be a Theory of Supreme Court
Confirmations?, Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association meeting, Mar.
21-23, 1991, at 6-14 (on file with author).
4. The Court reversed prior rulings only 32 times in the nineteenth century, compared to
174 times in the twentieth century. Furthermore, of those 174 doctrinal reversals, 157 have
occurred since 1937. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH - 1992, 11 (1992).
5. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988).
6. Id. at 1164-65.
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of fundamental constitutional law issues. Ackerman argued that, like a
tragic hero, it was precisely Bork's virtues that proved his undoing.7
Bork not only possessed a "transformative vision," 8 a desire for sig-
nificant if not wholesale doctrinal change, but also the legal ability and
intellectual dynamism to implement it. He therefore served as an unusu-
ally "compelling symbol of the Reagan effort to catalyze a judicial trans-
formation of Rooseveltian magnitude,"9 and uniquely presented the
Senate with the question of whether "President Reagan, like President
Roosevelt, [should] be granted the constitutional authority to make
transformative appointments." 10
The Senate's rejection of the Bork nomination can thus be seen as a
rejection of both Bork's constitutional philosophy and Reagan's author-
ity, particularly as a lame-duck president, to achieve further constitu-
tional change through his appointments. The general question, however,
remains: Under what conditions should a president be given the author-
ity to "rewrite" the Constitution through appointments to the Court?
The Framers' answer to that question was that the president does
not and should not have any such authority. In fact, they gave the presi-
dent no role at all in the constitutional amendment process. Under Arti-
cle V, only the Congress and state legislatures may alter the
Constitution. 1 Additionally, two-thirds of each House of Congress must
approve a proposed amendment, and three-fourths of the states must rat-
ify it. Formal constitutional change thus requires the consent of nearly
all state and national representatives. Consistent with many other fea-
tures of the Constitution, a small minority may veto the desires of even a
substantial majority.
In contrast, constitutional change through transformative appoint-
ments requires only the approval of the president and a bare majority of
Senators. State legislatures and the House of Representatives are ex-
cluded from the process. Additionally, approval of such appointments,
and the constitutional change they represent, does not require the broad
and enduring political support of the "super-majority" that Article V
mandates.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1168.
9. Id. at 1167.
10. Id. at 1169. For a discussion of Roosevelt's court packing plan, see infra note 53.
11. Under Article V, amendments may also be proposed by a national convention upon
the petition of two-thirds of the states and ratified by special state ratification conventions. All
existing amendments, however, have been proposed by Congress, and all but one have been
ratified by state legislatures. (The Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, was
ratified by state conventions.)
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According to Ackerman's assessment, the transformative appoint-
ment method of constitutional change is preferable to Article V in one
significant way-it is more appropriate to twentieth century American
politics. 2 We have become, since the Civil War, more a nation than a
collection of states. And, more than the Framers anticipated or desired,
presidential elections have taken on considerable significance as "a prin-
cipal way in which we democratically decide our fate as a People.... . 3
Thus, constitutional change led by the president and debated at the na-
tional level through transformative appointments better reflects "the
present American understanding" than Article V's "federalistic, assem-
bly-led" approach.' 4
This single virtue, however, is outweighed, according to Ackerman,
by three defects of transformative appointments as a method of demo-
cratic political change. Debate over constitutional change that occurs in
the context of evaluating a particular nominee is "almost inevitably
poorly focused," too often centering on "the personal style, charisma,
[and] frailties of the individual."' 5 This is certainly true when compared
to a national debate over the desirability of an explicitly worded constitu-
tional amendment. Transformative appointments may also give too
weighty a role to a president whose claim to a broad popular mandate
may be weak or faulty. 6 Presidential support of constitutional change
alone is "too institutionally flimsy to give credible evidence of the exist-
ence of the deep and broad popular support classically required for a
sharp break with the constitutional past."' 17 Finally, the transformative
appointment method is elitist. It does not require our national represent-
atives to take their constitutional reform agenda to the people for their
consideration and approval.
To solve the three problems of "legal focus[,] institutional weight
[and] popular responsiveness,""8 Ackerman proposed reforming the con-
stitutional amendment process. He suggested that
[d]uring his or her second term in office, a President may propose
constitutional amendments to the Congress of the United States; if
two-thirds of both Houses approve a proposal, it shall be listed on
the ballot at the next two succeeding presidential elections in each
of the several states; if three-fifths of the voters participating in
each of these elections should approve a proposed amendment, it
12. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1180.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1180-81.
16. Id. at 1181.
17. Id. at 1182.
18. Id.
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shall be ratified in the name of the People of the United States. 19
As Ackerman himself noted, his proposal is not without problems. The
first and most obvious is that his reform proposal itself would require
passing a constitutional amendment through the existing and exception-
ally cumbersome Article V process.
Even assuming that the Article V hurdle could be surmounted, it is
not clear that Ackerman's proposal would be effective. It may indeed be
true that transformative appointments are a risky way to enact constitu-
tional change in a democracy. But his proposal, like Article V, may be
too much of a good thing. Ackerman would require that only a second-
term president may propose such an amendment, that two-thirds of each
House must approve it, and that sixty percent of the voters must ratify
the amendment in two successive presidential elections. Such significant
hurdles are certain to insure that no such amendments are proposed or
passed and that presidents will continue to be tempted to choose the path
of least resistance-transformative appointments.2 °
Ackerman's reform proposal is unlikely to be passed or to produce
the desired results. It provides no disincentive for presidents to seek con-
stitutional change through their appointments, either explicitly, as with
Bork, or surreptitiously, as with Souter. Nor does it alter the confirma-
tion process to insure a more sharply focused national debate or a broad-
ening of the popular and institutional support required for approval of
transformative appointments. Ackerman's proposal simply does not ef-
fectively address the problem. In part, this is a product of his failure to
assess more precisely the seriousness of the problem and to identify its
source.
A. The Dangers of Transformative Appointments: Real or Imagined?
Ackerman identified potential dangers of allowing presidents to re-
vise constitutional law through their appointments without the clearly
focused national debate and broad political support desirable for such
19. Id. Ackerman presented the same argument in his book WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDA-
TIONS 52-55 (1991).
20. Ackerman responded that "Presidents would be quite reluctant to provoke the princi-
pled opposition likely to arise under the changed constitutional structure." Ackerman, supra
note 5, at 1182-83. This naively underestimates the willingness of presidents to try nonethe-
less. Ackerman also erroneously assumed that presidents and their supporters would be will-
ing to defend nominees as either lacking transformative intentions or as possessing only
legitimate intentions of returning to a true and faithful reading of the Constitution; in either
case presidents could claim that a formal constitutional amendment was not required. Finally,
Ackerman overestimated the ability of opponents to overcome the general inertia of the polit-
ical system, especially in Congress, and to mount an effective campaign against the president.
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revisions in a democracy. He failed to demonstrate, however, that those
dangers are real rather than potential and ongoing rather than episodic.
Ackerman in fact seemed rather ambivalent regarding the serious-
ness of the dangers of transformative appointments. For example, he
noted at the article's end, that we need not be so cynical as to assume
that all presidents will be "hell-bent on transformation" or that all nomi-
nees will engage in "corrupt bargains" with their presidential benefac-
tors.21 He further argued that, in any case, most Justices have properly
recognized their duty to apply the Constitution "on the basis of their
conscientious interpretation of two centuries of constitutional develop-
ment, and not merely [to] serve as well-paid servants of the President
who put them into office." 22 If the corrupt and partisan appointee is so
rare, however, why is such significant reform of the amending process
necessary to protect us from the dangers of transformative
appointments?
Ackerman implicitly (and belatedly) acknowledged that there are
limits on a president's ability to achieve constitutional change. The pres-
ident must first be given the opportunity to appoint several Justices, a
matter of both luck and reelection. 3 Replacing a majority on the Court
may also require that successive presidents share the same constitutional
reform agenda. Those presidents must also receive the support of a ma-
jority of the Senate, whose composition and party control is subject to at
least some change.
Moreover, appointees must live up to presidential expectations,
faithfully and consistently implementing the president's constitutional re-
form agenda. This is by no means a certainty.2 a New appointees must
21. Id. at 1183.
22. Id.
23. As Jimmy Carter's presidency demonstrated, some presidents are unusually unlucky.
In addition to losing his reelection bid in rather spectacular fashion, Carter was the only presi-
dent to serve a full term without a single vacancy occurring on the Court. (He did, however,
appoint more than 250 federal judges to the lower courts.) Franklin Roosevelt's success in
obtaining a Court more sympathetic to his New Deal policies was a function of winning four
successive elections. Roosevelt did not have the opportunity to appoint a single member to the
Court until his second term, and his last four appointments (out of a total of nine) did not
occur until his third term. On the average, a vacancy on the Court occurs every 1.82 years,
giving a single-term president 2.2 appointments and a two-term president 4.4 appointments.
John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different Than Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 877 (1991).
24. While not certain, it is likely. Contrary to what Laurence Tribe called "the myth of
the surprised president," most appointees do in fact live up to presidential expectations. My
own analysis shows that approximately 20% of all Supreme Court nominees have disappointed
the President who appointed them. Many of these, however, should more properly be labelled
presidential mistakes. Only a very small number of appointees executed what could be termed
a judicial metamorphosis. See TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (forth-
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also secure majority support within the Court for the desired changes-
including both the general constitutional principles and their specific
doctrinal formulations-and may have to persuade other Justices to
abandon longstanding precedent.25
Even a new Court majority fully and firmly united in its commit-
ment to the president's constitutional reform agenda is not sufficient to
guarantee success. The Court cannot simply announce a new set of con-
stitutional principles and dictate, by its words alone, the new social, eco-
nomic or political reality it desires. As judicial impact research
consistently reveals, compliance with the Court's decisions is neither au-
tomatic nor uniform. Successful implementation of new constitutional
doctrines requires the willingness of parties to obey the Court's decisions,
faithful application of new doctrine by lower court judges (state and fed-
eral), as well as budgetary and enforcement support by the other
branches, perhaps at all levels of government. 26 This is no mean task.
This certainly does not imply that presidents have no power to alter
the Constitution through their appointments. Despite the litany of "ifs"
listed above, the fact remains that many presidents have indeed reshaped
coming 1993). See also LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 50 (1985)
("For the most part, and especially in areas of particular and known concern to a President,
Justices have been loyal to the ideals and perspectives of the men who have nominated
them."); DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
107-10 (1976) (fewer than one-fourth of the nominees generally voted contrary to the views of
their appointing president); ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESI-
DENCY 147 (1971) ("about one [J]ustice in four whose performance could be evaluated did not
conform to the expectations of his appointer in important matters that came before the
Supreme Court"); John B. Gates & Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, and
Racial Equality Cases: 1954-1984, 10 POL. BEHAV. 22, 33 (1988) (finding even greater presi-
dential success; "Presidential appointment appears to guarantee long-term representation of
the unique policy perspectives of presidents"); Edward V. Heck & Steven A. Shull, Policy
Preferences of Justices and Presidents: The Case of Civil Rights, 4 L. & POL'Y Q. 327, 333-35
(1982) ("recent presidents have been only moderately successful in appointing [Jiustices who
would later take positions consistent with the appointing president's public statements on civil
rights... 9 of the 14 [J]ustices (64%) voted as expected." However, presidential "success,"
ranging from 50% to 92%, depended largely on a president's attentiveness to civil rights, thus
echoing Tribe's conclusion.).
25. For the classic analysis of the challenges facing the policy-motivated Justice, see WAL-
TER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
26. THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M.
Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973); CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1968); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970); Bradley C. Canon, Courts and Policy: Com-
pliance, Implementation, and Impact, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
435 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
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the Court's doctrinal framework, and virtually all have tried.27 Further-
more, Presidents Reagan and Bush have enjoyed considerable success in
steering the Court (indeed the entire federal judiciary) in a conservative
direction.28
The problem with Ackerman's indictment is its reliance on an exag-
gerated and overly generalized view of a president's power to alter the
Constitution single-handedly. Most importantly, Ackerman failed to
note that the danger of the president's success in enacting constitutional
change through appointments without popular support is far greater in
the twentieth century than it was in the nineteenth. Furthermore, it is
far greater today than ten years ago. Rather than making the generalized
claim that transformative appointments are dangerous, it might be more
appropriate to argue that a balance of power between the president and
Congress in controlling the Court's composition and ideological make-up
is desirable but increasingly less likely. Examining that shift and identi-
fying its sources will lead to reform solutions which are more effective
than amending Article V.
III. The Growth of Presidential Power in Control of the Court
Three pieces of evidence demonstrate that the balance of power in
influencing the Supreme Court has shifted decidedly in the president's
favor. First, the rate of Senate rejections of presidential nominees to the
Court declined dramatically in the twentieth century. In a related trend,
Congress reduced its use of constitutionally provided Court-curbing and
Court-influencing tools. Senate acquiescence in the Reagan-Bush con-
27. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1992).
28. For a journalistic account, see DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING
OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992). Savage surveyed the Court's decisions from
Rehnquist's ascension to the Chief Justiceship in 1986 through Souter's participation in his
first term ending 1991. He concluded that the new winners in the Rehnquist Court include
government officials and prosecutors. The new losers are individuals and their constitutional
rights, except those asserting free speech and free press rights and white males challenging
affirmative action programs. Savage characterized the Rehnquist Court as a "pro-government
conservative Court," which upholds government authority in virtually all areas, from abortion
to economic regulation to treatment of prisoners and the criminally accused. It is not, he
argued, a "Chamber of Commerce Conservative Court," willing to challenge the government's
power to regulate private economic activity. Id. at 455-56. See also Sheldon Goldman, Rea-
ganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313 (1985); Jon Gott-
schall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986); Walter F. Murphy, The Legacy of Reagan's Judicial
Strategy, in THE REAGAN IMPRINT (Larry Berman ed., 1989); C. K. Rowland, et al., Presi-
dential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22
L. Soc'Y REV. 191 (1988).
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servative transformation of the Court, despite its opposition to that de-
velopment, demonstrates the excessive presidential power in controlling
of the Court.
A. The "Spineless Senate"
In his 1985 book advocating more rigorous, ideology-based review
of Supreme Court nominees by the Senate, Laurence Tribe addressed the
"myth of the spineless Senate."2 9 He refuted the empirical view of the
Senate as a rubber-stamp for presidential nominations by noting that
nearly one in five Supreme Court nominations have failed to win confir-
mation. 0 Tribe's brief historical review of Senate rejections led him to
conclude that "the upper house of Congress has been scrutinizing
Supreme Court nominees and rejecting them on the basis of their polit-
ical, judicial, and economic philosophies ever since George Washington
was President."'"
Tribe's account and conclusion are misleading. Including the Sen-
ate's refusal to vote on the Fortas promotion to Chief Justice, only five
Supreme Court nominations have failed to win Senate confirmation in
the twentieth century. 2 This includes a seventy-five year span, from
1894 to 1968, in which only one nomination was rejected. Additionally,
only six of the twenty-six Supreme Court nominations since the end of
World War II produced more than twenty-five negative votes.33 The one
in five rejection ratio cited by Tribe is distorted by the nearly one in three
rejection record set by the Senate in the nineteenth century.3 4 In con-
trast, only one in ten nominations have failed to receive confirmation in
the twentieth century.35 Put another way, presidents in the twentieth
29. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 77-92.
30. Id. at 78.
31. Id. at 92.
32. The Senate rejected President Hoover's nomination of John Parker in 1930, Nixon's
nominations of Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and G. Harrold Carswell in 1970, and Reagan's
nomination of Robert Bork in 1987. President Johnson's nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to
fill the Chief Justice seat was withdrawn in 1968 after the Senate failed to defeat a motion to
end floor debate and bring the nomination to a vote.
33. Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 3, at 5. Clarence Thomas' confirmation vote in-
creases their stated "5 of 25 nominations" to 6 of 26.
34. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 39 (2d ed. 1985). See also Simson,
supra note 1, at 324; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1501 (noting that "roughly one in
four" nominees were rejected). Of the 65 nominations submitted to the Senate in the nine-
teenth century, 29.2% (or 1 for every 3.44 nominations) failed to win confirmation. (Calcula-
tions based on ABRAHAM, supra note 34, and TRIBE, supra note 24, at 142-151.)
35. Simson, supra note I, at 323. This figure does not include the nomination of Homer
Thornberry by President Lyndon Johnson. The Senate did not act on the nomination because
Abe Fortas's withdrawal from consideration for Chief Justice rendered the issue moot.
Fall 19921
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
century have enjoyed a ninety percent success rate in their nominal battle
with the Senate over control of the Court's membership. Thus, ample
empirical evidence supports the assertion of Professor Sulfridge that
since 1894 there has existed "a Senate presumption in favor of
confirmation."36
According to Richard Friedman, the primary cause of this dramatic
change in the Senate's response to Supreme Court nominations was the
elevation in the Court's status and apolitical reputation. In the first half
of the nineteenth century, and especially during Reconstruction, "the
Supreme Court was at a low point in prestige and was regarded much
like a political institution, the membership of which, senators believed,
should be geographically dispersed and politically reliable."37 As a re-
sult, Senate opposition to nominations based on partisan and patronage
grounds was "politically reputable."38
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, momentous changes
had occurred. Sectional and partisan rivalries had dissipated, and the
workload and reputation of judges in general, and the Supreme Court in
particular, had vastly improved. As a result, "political interference in
the selection process was generally scorned," and "[c]onfirmation of
qualified [J]ustices was perceived as a welcome expression of nationalism
and nonpartisanship."39
The twentieth century norm of judicial independence has worked to
the distinct advantage of the president, due to the Executive's dominant
role as the initiator of the appointment process. Court-packing attempts
by presidents are easy to mask. They need only employ the proper termi-
nology, paying tribute to normative expectations regarding the judicial
role. Thus, the nominee is inevitably intelligent and open-minded, would
interpret the Constitution rather than legislate from the bench, and pos-
sesses the requisite integrity and judicial temperament. 40
Of course, the Senate's refusal to confirm five nominees in the twen-
tieth century demonstrates that the president does not have complete
36. Wayne Sulfridge, Ideology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court
Nominations, 42 J. POL. 560, 562-63 (1980).
37. Richard D. Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court
Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDoZO L.
REV. 1, 4 (1983).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5.
40. The White House "script" in the Reagan-Bush years, according to Strauss and Sun-
stein was to assert that "the nominee is open-minded, has 'no agenda,' enthusiastically accepts
both Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. Connecticut, is humbled by the difficulty of
being a Justice, and admires Justice Harlan." Stauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1492.
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freedom to "build the Court of his dreams."41 Nevertheless, Senate-im-
posed constraints or boundaries within which presidents must operate in
selecting their nominees have broadened considerably. Unless the presi-
dent mistakenly nominates an individual who is obviously unqualified
and ill-suited for the Court like G. Harrold Carswell42 or greatly out of
the political and judicial mainstream like Robert Bork,43 it is highly un-
likely that the Senate will challenge or reject the president's nominees.
While Court-packing attempts by the president are both expected and
tolerated, politically motivated rejection by the Senate is regarded as im-
proper interference with the independence of the Court.
B. The Weakening of Congressional Checks on the Court
The president and Congress have frequently struggled over control
of the Court. However, in keeping with the substantial decline in the rate
at which the Senate rejects Supreme Court nominees, the number and
variety of tools Congress uses to compete with the president in influenc-
ing the Court have diminished since the latter part of the nineteenth
century.
No doubt the most rancorous battle between the president and Con-
gress over the Court occurred between the Federalists and Jeffersonian
Republicans after the 1800 election." Lame-duck President John Ad-
ams and the outgoing Federalists in Congress passed the Judiciary Act in
1801, which reduced the number of justices from six to five (effective
with the next vacancy) and created new judgeships which were promptly
41. The phrase belongs to Laurence Tribe, supra note 24, at 76.
42. In addition to his poor civil rights record, Carswell was widely regarded, in Henry
Abraham's words, as a "patently inferior [candidate], simply on the basis of fundamental ju-
ridical and legal qualifications." ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 16. Louis Pollak, then Dean of
the Yale Law School, asserted that Carswell possessed "more slender credentials than any
Supreme Court nominee put forth in this century." Id. Even the President's floor manager of
the nomination in the Senate, Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska, had a difficult time defend-
ing Carswell; he argued to his Senate colleagues that "[e]ven if he is mediocre, there are a lot of
mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't
they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Cardozos and Frankfurters, and stuff
like that there." Id. at 16-17. In addition, Carswell held the dubious record of having been
reversed by appellate courts more than any of the other then-sitting federal jurists except
seven." Id. at 17.
43. While some have challenged the validity of this claim, Bork was certainly widely per-
ceived as a judicial radical. See Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102
HARV. L. REv. 672, 685-86 (1988), discussing the Justice Department's statistical study of
Bork's judicial record (provided in A Response to the Critics of Judge Robert H. Bork, 9 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 373 (1987) (reprint from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs)).
44. Even before this momentous episode, the Senate rejected George Washington's nomi-
nation of John Rutledge for Chief Justice because of the nominee's opposition to the Jay
Treaty. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 79-80.
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filled with loyal Federalists. The new Congress quickly responded by
repealing the 1801 Act and even postponed the Court's next term to in-
sure that it could not hear an upcoming challenge to the repealing legisla-
tion. The House also impeached Justice Samuel Chase, a Federalist, on
grounds of "high crimes and misdemeanors."45 The Senate refused to
confirm subsequent appointees to the federal bench who were not
Republicans.46
Congress has altered the size of the Court to secure a particular
membership and ideological bent at other times as well. The number of
Associate Justices was increased from six to eight in the final days of
Andrew Jackson's Administration. After a close five-to-four decision up-
holding the blockade of the Confederacy,47 the size of the Court was
increased to ten, thereby affording Lincoln a more secure pro-Union ma-
jority on the Court. To prevent President Andrew Johnson from ap-
pointing Justices who might fail to uphold its Reconstruction program,
the powerful Republican Congress reduced the Court's size, as each va-
cancy occurred, from ten to seven Justices. The embattled Johnson was
never permitted an appointment to the Court, and the existing majority
of Lincoln appointees remained secure. After Ulysses Grant's election,
Congress again expanded the size of the Court, this time to nine, where it
remains to this day. President Grant promptly used the new vacancies to
engineer a reversal of the Hepburn decision, which had denied Congress
the power to authorize the use of paper currency.4 8
This selective account is certainly not intended to provide an ex-
haustive or representative list of such inter-branch conflicts.49 It only
illustrates the wider variety of Congressional tools previously used to in-
45. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 76.
46. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR
POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 171 (1991).
47. The Prize Case, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
48. Due to the new appointees, Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), was
overruled in The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). One commentator has
argued, however, that the legal tender issue was not the sole reason for the nominees' selection.
See 4 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, 713-38 (Paul Freund ed., 1971). See also Sidney
Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant, 50 POL. Sc. Q. 343 (1935).
49. For a fuller account, see ADAM C. BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT
(1970); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME
COURT, 1957-1960 (1961); JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG, THE SUPREME
COURT AND CONGRESS (1972); Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court
Reversals, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 L. & Soc'Y REV. 309
(1980); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REv. 925
(1965).
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fluence the Court and its decisions, either directly or by affecting the
president's capacity to do so. Not only was the Senate willing to reject
presidential nominees at a very high rate (including a record five of six
for President John Tyler), Congress felt free to tinker with the size of the
Court for blatantly political purposes. It also postponed judicial consid-
eration of a sensitive issue by abolishing an upcoming term of the Court
in 1802, nearly succeeded in removing a "political undesirable" from the
Court in 1804, and withdrew the sensitive issue of the constitutionality of
Reconstruction legislation from the Court's jurisdiction in 1868.50 The
twentieth century record of Congressional interference with the Court
pales in comparison.5 1
As Friedman has explained, the perceived propriety of such Con-
gressional interference with the judiciary underwent significant change
by the turn of the century. 2 There is no more clear and certain evidence
of this than Franklin Roosevelt's failed attempt to secure Congressional
permission to expand the Court, in essence, by six members. 3 Fresh
from their decisive electoral victory, both Roosevelt and his Democratic
Congress were eager to proceed with their New Deal agenda and were
united in their antagonism toward the obstructionist majority on the
Court. But Congress would not consent to a proposal that was seen as
too direct and radical an assault on the judiciary, and one that had been
foisted upon them by the impatient Roosevelt. 4
50. In its fear over the outcome of legal challenges to the constitutionality of major Re-
construction legislation, Congress in 1868 repealed the Court's jurisdiction over writs of
habeas corpus for cases involving military offenses. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
the 1868 repeal act in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
51. Congress has attempted to restrict the Court's jurisdiction on numerous occasions, but
no such proposals have succeeded. The two most notable efforts were the Jenner bill to forbid
review of Congress's investigatory power during the McCarthy era and the 1968 proposal to
restrict the Court's review of Miranda-based challenges to state criminal convictions. More
typically, Congress reacts to Court decisions it views unfavorably by limiting their impact
through implementation and funding decisions. The Hyde Amendment, restricting the use of
Medicaid funds for abortion, is an excellent example of Congress limiting the impact of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Friedman, supra note 37, at 4.
53. Roosevelt did not directly propose expanding the Court by six members. Rather, his
transparently political proposal was to enhance the Court's capacity to handle its workload by
creating a new position for every Justice over the age of 70 years and 6 months. Thus, for each
of the then six sitting Justices over that age refusing to resign, Roosevelt would get an
appointment.
54. See JOSEPH ALsoP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); ROBERT H. JACK-
SON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN
POWER POLITICS (1941). Congress did, however, pass legislation allowing full rather than
half pay for Justices at age seventy retiring after ten years of service, which may have helped
persuade the recalcitrant older Justices to retire. O'BRIEN, supra note 46, at 172.
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The relevant lesson from this episode is that, by 1937, an extraordi-
narily popular president who enjoyed great support in the Congress still
could not convince his close allies to employ a constitutionally legitimate
and, in the nineteenth century, not infrequently-used tool to achieve a
political goal of utmost importance to both. That is quite a remarkable
change.
C. Senate Acquiescence in the Reagan-Bush Transformation of the
Court
As a general rule, presidents in the twentieth century have come to
enjoy a significant competitive advantage over the Senate in shaping the
Court's composition. If recent events are any indication, this competitive
advantage has become a virtual monopoly of power. The Senate has ac-
quiesced in the recent conservative transformation of the Court to a far
greater degree than one would expect, given the factors leading to Senate
rejections of past presidential nominees.
Although Senate rejections have been rare in this century, they do
occur. According to a number of studies, when a nominee is perceived as
altering the critical ideological balance on the Court, when the Senate is
controlled by the opposition party, and when the president is lame-duck
or otherwise politically-weakened, Senate rejections are far more likely to
occur.
5 5
Thus, the ease with which Antonin Scalia was confirmed is ex-
plained by Republican control of the Senate and the fact that he would
be replacing another conservative, William Rehnquist, who was being
elevated to replace the retiring conservative Chief Justice Warren Burger.
In contrast, the Bork nomination was clearly doomed according to this
formula. The Democrats had regained control of the Senate, Reagan was
a lame-duck president, and he was politically-weakened due to the Iran-
Contra scandal. Furthermore, the very conservative and controversial
Bork would be replacing the moderately conservative Lewis Powell, who
55. See Charles Cameron, et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitu-
tional Model, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 525 (1990); John D. Felice & Herbert F. Weisberg, The
Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region in Confirmation of Supreme Court
Nominees, 1953-1988, 77 Ky. L.J. 509 (1988-89). Thomas Halper, Senate Rejection of
Supreme Court Nominees, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 102 (1972); Jan Palmer, Senate Confirmation of
Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 Rnv. Soc. EcON. 152 (1983); Jeffrey Segal, Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998
(1987); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominees, 13 L. & Soc'y Rv. 927 (1979); Sulfridge, supra note 36; William F. Swin-
dler, The Politics of "Advice and Consent," 56 A.B.A. J. 533 (1971); George Watson & John
Stookey, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings: A View from the Senate, JUDICATURE 186
(1988).
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held the swing vote in many close and politically contentious decisions,
especially those regarding civil rights and abortion.
According to the same conventional wisdom, however, one would
have expected far more Senate opposition to Reagan's nomination of
Anthony Kennedy and Bush's nomination of David Souter than actually
occurred. The Democrats retained their majority status in both the
House and Senate, and party polarization and party-line voting in Con-
gress increased during the Reagan-Bush years. At the time of the Ken-
nedy nomination, Reagan remained lame-duck and politically weakened.
Tensions between Congress and the Court continued to escalate, spurred
on by several Court decisions regarding civil rights, executive power, and
abortion. Additionally, Anthony Kennedy was to replace the less con-
servative Powell and, more of a watershed, David Souter would be taking
the seat vacated by William Brennan, no doubt the strongest and most
effective voice for the Court's liberal wing. Given these many factors
predisposing the Senate to reject, why did it not respond more vigorously
to or even reject the Kennedy and Souter nominations?
The Senate's failure to reject Clarence Thomas is similarly puzzling.
Thomas possessed limited experience, had been severely criticized for his
performance as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, 6 received a lower American Bar Association rating than any
previously confirmed nominee,5 7 and was vigorously opposed by civil
rights and women's rights groups, particularly as an inappropriate re-
placement for the liberal civil rights crusader, Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall.58 Thomas also attempted to distance himself from numerous
56. Every article on the subject in the major papers the day after President Bush's an-
nouncement of the Thomas nomination seized on these two issues. In fact, the first question
asked at the press conference announcing Thomas's nomination focused on charges that the
nominee was "insensitive to the concerns of the elderly and civil rights advocates," and that
while he was the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the EEOC
did not aggressively pursue their claims. The Supreme Court: Excerpts from News Conference
Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1991, at A14. For an account of the Thomas
nomination and confirmation, see SAVAGE, supra note 28, at 423-50.
57. A twelve-person majority on the ABA's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
rated Thomas as "qualified," a minimum passing grade. A minority of two members found
Thomas "not qualified" and one abstained. (In contrast, Souter was unanimously rated "well
qualified.") Neil A. Lewis, Bar Association Splits on Fitness of Thomas for the Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at Al.
58. Thomas was opposed by the AFL-CIO and, after some initial uncertainty, by the
NAACP. Roberto Suro, N.A.A.C.P. Defers Stance on Court Pick, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at
A12; Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. and Top Labor Unite to Oppose Thomas," N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 1, 1991, at Al. He was also opposed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., the Congressional Black Caucus, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, People for the
American Way, National Abortion Rights Action League, National Organization for Women,
Alliance for Justice, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The National Urban
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controversial statements regarding the uses of natural law for conserva-
tive purposes, and incredibly asserted that he had never expressed nor
formulated an opinion, not even in private, regarding the Court's Roe v.
Wade abortion decision. 9 Even serious charges of sexual harassment
made by a highly credible witness, Professor Anita Hill, were insufficient
to produce majority opposition in the Senate.' °
Two factors account for this heightened spinelessness on the part of
the Senate in recent years. First, Presidents Reagan and Bush used their
built-in advantage in Court-packing with exceptional skill. They raised
(or lowered, depending on one's view) the art of screening judicial candi-
dates and waging an effective confirmation campaign on their behalf to a
new level.61
A conservative Republican president can choose one of two strate-
gies to win support from a Democratic Senate for conservative judicial
nominees. The first is to fight-to employ all the tools of persuasion and
power available to the president and try to bludgeon the Senate into ac-
League voted to take no position and the American Civil Liberties Union decided (by one vote)
not to oppose the Thomas nomination. The day the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
began, however, two-thirds of Americans had not yet made up their mind. Adam Clymer,
Most Americans Are Undecided on Court Nomination, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991,
at Al.
59. In a 1987 speech, Thomas had praised Lewis Lehrman's article comparing fetuses to
slaves and abortions to the Holocaust as a "splendid example of applying natural law." Neil
A. Lewis, Court Nominee Is Linked to Anti-Abortion Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at Al,
D18. At the Judiciary Committee hearings, however, Thomas asserted that his praise of Lehr-
man was merely a tool to persuade a conservative audience to embrace natural law generally,
which in turn might encourage them to accept the use of natural law on behalf of civil rights.
The next day, he told the Committee that he may have only skimmed Lehrman's article and
had not reread it since. He also stated that his earlier remarks supporting the use of natural
law to provide for greater judicial protection of economic rights were the musings of a part-
time political theorist and had no bearing on his views regarding how a judge should approach
such issues. Thomas stated that he accepted a general constitutional right of privacy but re-
fused to give his opinion regarding its extension to abortion. He asserted that to do so would
impair his impartiality, that he had "no private agenda" regarding the abortion issue, Neil A.
Lewis, Thomas Declines Requests by Panel for Abortion View, N. Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1991, at
Al, and that he had never expressed an opinion on Roe v. Wade. Thomas Undergoes Tough
Questions on Past Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al, A21. In the recent decision
upholding most of Pennsylvania's abortion regulations, Justice Thomas joined both the Rehn-
quist and Scalia opinions, which provided a scathing attack of Roe and argued for its reversal.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
60. Thomas was hurt by Hill's charges of sexual harassment, although there is some ques-
tion of how much. "Both sides estimate that Thomas lost about 10 votes that he might have
had before the Hill allegations emerged-narrowing an outcome that still would have been one
of the closest in history. But only three senators publicly shifted positions." Joan Biskupic,
Thomas' Victory Puts Icing on Reagan-Bush Court, CONG. Q. 3026, 3030 (Oct. 19, 1991).
61. According to Ethan Bronner, the White House campaign on behalf of Bork was an
exception. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUsTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 348 (1989). Bruce Fein would agree. Fein, supra note I, at 685-87.
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ceptance. As the Bork nomination proved, that is a risky strategy. Al-
ternatively, the president can resort to subterfuge by employing the
strategy, now proven successful, of nominating individuals whose pri-
mary virtue is anonymity.62 Kennedy, Thomas, and particularly the en-
igmatic Souter possessed the slimmest of credentials and minimal
experience to qualify for a seat on the Court. But more importantly, they
had spoken or written little on the burning constitutional issues of the
day, thus making the Senate's search for a "legitimate" basis for rejection
more difficult. Unfortunately for the Senate, it no longer possessed the
nineteenth century luxury of rejecting the president's nominees to the
Court virtually at will.
In addition, the Senate could hardly expect Presidents Reagan or
Bush to respond by replacing a rejected Kennedy or Souter with a liberal
nominee more to the liking of Democratic Senators. Consequently, the
Senate could quite legitimately reason that it made little sense to spend
considerable time and energy rejecting a nominee when the replacement
would likely be similar or "worse." In the end, the Senate has been re-
duced to acquiescing to the president's choice.
The Senate increasingly has lacked the will and the power to defeat
Supreme Court nominees it would prefer to reject. Had the views and
subsequent decisions of Kennedy and Souter been presented to the Con-
gress in the form of statutory initiatives or constitutional amendment
proposals, they would no doubt have been rejected.63 When such "pro-
posals," however, are hidden or disguised in the form of a Supreme
62. Robert Bork correctly predicted this to be one of the undesirable results of his defeat
in the Senate. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 347-48 (1990); Robert H.
Bork, The Full Court Press: The Drive for Control of the Courts, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
58 (1990).
63. For example, Souter and Kennedy provided the fourth and fifth votes in upholding
the Reagan Administration's "gag rule," forbidding abortion counseling and referral in feder-
ally-funded family planning clinics. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991). Congress's at-
tempt to reverse the Rust decision met with a Bush veto, which it failed to override. Justice
Kennedy provided the critical fifth vote in several employment discrimination decisions in
1989 which met with Congressional disapproval. See especially, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that employees challenging employment practices having
racially discriminatory impact bear the burden of proving such practices are motivated by
discriminatory intent rather than business needs, thus overruling Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971)); Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that
§ 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act forbids racial discrimination in hiring but not on-the-job
racial harassment); and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing white employees to
challenge court-approved consent decrees embodying affirmative action plans). Congress sub-
sequently passed the 1990 Civil Rights Act which would have reversed these decisions. Presi-
dent Bush, however, vetoed the Act, and the Senate failed to override by one vote. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, signed by Bush, overturned twelve Supreme Court rulings, including
Wards Cove, Patterson, and Martin v. Wilks. See O'BRIEN, supra note 4, at 26-27.
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Court nominee (especially a "stealth" nominee like Souter), and when
they are put forward by an unusually popular and skillful President, the
Senate is far more constrained.
IV. The Value of Balance in Political Control of the Court
The recent shift toward presidential dominance in the selection of
Supreme Court Justices is troubling. Such dominance undermines the
Framers' conception of balanced government as a protection against tyr-
anny. In their view, the threat of tyranny was reduced and liberty better
secured by dividing governmental power and supplying each institution
with the motive and sufficient power to check the others."4 Thus, before
the government can use its coercive power, it must achieve agreement
among numerous and diverse institutions (and, by implication, broad
popular consent). In other words, neither the president, the Congress,
nor the Court was to possess unilateral power to achieve significant polit-
ical change. Furthermore, the Framers added far more significant hur-
dles with regard to constitutional change. The Framers simply did not
trust single elections to reveal accurately the true wishes of the people or
the common good for purposes of ordinary legislation, let alone constitu-
tional change.65 In their view, the president possesses a claim, but only a
partial claim, to understanding the popular will or the national good.
The same may be said of the House and Senate. Bargaining between
these differently composed institutions, however, should produce a
broader and more inclusive political consensus.
This plan for institutional competition, balance, and if need be,
stalemate, in the interest of preventing tyranny applies not only to policy
concerns but to judicial selection and constitutional law concerns as well.
In other words, permitting momentous constitutional changes to turn on
the outcome of a single presidential election (even a landslide) is an egre-
gious violation of the Framers' desire for balanced and nontyrannical
government.
The Framers, in any case, specifically provided for shared and bal-
anced control of the judiciary. The President may nominate members to
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (New American Library ed.,
1961).
65. Representative government, in the Framers' view, was not intended solely to reveal
the popular will or to compensate for the practical difficulties of direct democracy. It was
instead intended to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (New American
Library ed., 1961).
[Vol. 20:69
the federal bench, but the Senate must approve the President's choices.66
Congress possesses the power to remove federal judges through the im-
peachment process,67 create inferior courts, 68 regulate the appellate juris-
diction of the federal courts,6 9 fix the budget 70 and terms of the Court,
and alter its size.71 Additional checks are provided by the discretionary
power of Congress and the Executive Branch to fund and enforce the
Court's decisions. Because each institution is composed differently and
competition is encouraged among them, political control of the judici-
ary-its membership, size, jurisdiction, and implementation of its deci-
sions-is shared and balanced, rather than arbitrary and tyrannical.
Using the term "political control" in this context no doubt strikes
fear in the hearts of many scholars for whom the independence and
apolitical nature of the judiciary is an ideal of paramount importance.
While the Court's decisions should certainly not be dictated or program-
med in advance by politicians, it is commonly accepted that the Supreme
Court exercises significant discretionary power in interpreting the Con-
stitution and that a Justice's personal views play a significant role in that
interpretive process. It follows that a nominee's political beliefs and judi-
cial philosophy are of profound importance to our Constitution's future
and thus to political leaders who are constitutionally empowered to
shape that future.
The legitimacy of vigorous ideology-based Senate review of Supreme
Court nominees is by no means a settled issue. While few scholars would
66. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67. "[Ihe House of Representatives... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment...
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
68. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish .... U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. "The Congress shall have Power... to constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
69. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority .... In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
70. This is a function of Congress's general budgetary authority. Congress cannot reduce
the salaries of any federal judge. ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
... receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.) Congress can, however, choose not to
increase the Court's budget or its members' salaries. For example, in 1964, to communicate its
displeasure with the Warren Court (especially its rights of the accused and school prayer deci-
sions), Congress increased the annual salary of federal judges by $7500, while providing the
Justices with only a $4500 increase.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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endorse Richard Nixon's grandiose assertion that the president is "the
one person entrusted by the Constitution with the power of appoint-
ment,"72 many would find troubling the more aggressive and political
Senate role advanced here.
Bruce Fein, for example, argued that such a role would violate the
Framers' intent. According to his reading of Federalist No. 76, Fein as-
serted that the Framers intended the Senate only to examine "whether
the nominee [is] intellectually competent and whether [the] nomination
[is] tainted by cronyism, corruption, or crass political partisanship."73
Many commentators, however, dispute that interpretation.74
Insistence that the Senate examine only professional fitness or a
nominee's judicial, as opposed to political, philosophy simply ignores our
knowledge regarding constitutional interpretation and judicial decision-
making. Judicial behavior research consistently reveals the importance
of political attitudes in influencing judicial decisionmaking.75 Addition-
ally, it is not difficult to demonstrate, as do Critical Legal Studies schol-
72. Nixon made this assertion during the Senate debate over the Carswell nomination.
116 CONG. REc. 10158 (1970) (letter from Richard M. Nixon to William Saxbe, Apr. 2, 1970).
73. Fein, supra note 1, at 687. In applying that standard, Fein gave the Bork nomination
an unusually nonpolitical cast, noting that it was plausible that Reagan merely "wanted to
leave as part of his legacy an exceptionally talented jurist who shared his view of the proper
judicial role." Id. at 672. In fact, Fein played a major role in shaping Reagan's highly central-
ized and ideologically-focused judicial recruitment and selection process. He has remarked
that "[t]he judiciary is a primary player in the formulation of public policy" and therefore, "it
would be silly for an administration not to try to affect the direction of legal policy" through
its judicial appointments. David M. O'Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Leg-
acy?, in THE REAGAN LEGACY 60, 65 (Charles 0. Jones ed., 1988). While perhaps not tainted
by corruption or pure patronage concerns, the Bork nomination was a clear effort at Court-
packing which legitimated a like response from the Senate. For a similar argument that the
Framers intended a quite limited Senate role, see Hickok, Jr., supra note 1; A. Mitchell Mc-
Connell, Jr., Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59 KY. L.J. 7,
32 (1970).
74. Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L. J. 657, 658-62 (1970); James E. Gauch, The Intended Role of the Senate in
Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1989); Simson, supra note 1, at 306-12;
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1494-1502.
75. That is especially the case where the law is unclear and precedent is absent or conflict-
ing. Of course, it is precisely those type of "hard" cases that are likely to find their way onto
the Supreme Court's docket. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948);
ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 24, at 118-31; HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY
MAKING: EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION (1979); JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CASES IN FEDERALISM, 1889-1959 (1968); Saul
Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court:
Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75 (1987); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 557 (1989); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 75 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 355 (1981). Judicial behavior research regard-
ing the lower courts is also quite voluminous.
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ars, that no interpretive approach has yet been found that successfully
constrains judicial discretion and limits the intrusion of the judge's per-
sonal views.76 In any case, even a "correct" approach to constitutional
interpretation (assuming one exists) would produce a distinct set of polit-
ical consequences, as would Bork's theory of original understanding.77
In a democracy, Senators bear a responsibility to their constituents, and
the nation as a whole, to examine those consequences, ascertain their
desirability, and vote accordingly.
Another significant defect in Fein's argument is that the preference
for a more limited Senate role was expressed at a time when the Supreme
Court was not expected to play such a significant role in national poli-
cymaking.78 The Framers' overwhelming preference for balanced, and
even stalemated government, regarding both policy and constitutional
change, should take precedence over specific views expressed at a time
when the Court was not expected to be so powerful.
Another set of objections to an active and political confirmation role
focuses on Senate capacity. Fein argued that the Senate is "ill-suited in-
tellectually, morally, and politically to pass on anything more substantive
than a nominee's professional fitness ...." Senators, he asserted, tend to
be "intellectually shallow and result-oriented."79 To complete the argu-
ment, Fein must defend presidents in terms of their unusual fitness and
their possession of more noble (i.e. non-result-oriented) intentions in
their nominations to the Court. Most presidents, however, rank ideology
76. For a sampling of this extensive literature, see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Paul Brest, The Fundamen-
tal Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,
90 YALE L. J. 1063 (1981); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN L. REV. 1 (1984);
Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
77. Bork responded that his philosophy may have had political consequences, but it
lacked "political content or intention." Judges faithfully applying the Constitution's original
meaning do not intend either liberal or conservative results. It is only because recent liberal
Courts have illegitimately written their preferences into the Constitution that his original un-
derstanding approach would appear to produce conservative results. BORK, supra note 62, at
177-78.
78. Another commentator made a similar point. Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation
Process: Law or Politics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1205-06 n.17 (1988).
79. Fein, supra note 1, at 673. Stephen Carter agreed that Senators are too result-oriented
in their appraisal of a nominee's judicial philosophy. Carter, however, would assign them the
role of evaluating whether a nominee possesses the "right moral instincts." Fein found the
Senate especially unfit in this regard. See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1988). Friedman agreed that the Senate is "less able to consider the
nominee's record reflectively." Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confir-
mation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1313 (1986).
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above merit-based criteria in selecting their nominees.80
Further, Fein's argument that the Senate is too parochial in outlook
misunderstands the Framers' purpose in composing and structuring
political institutions differently. The Senate's representation of state in-
terests only enhances its capacity to serve as a check on the president.
The president's reading of the popular will or national good regarding
desirable constitutional change may be erroneous. Presidential prefer-
ences are to be subjected to a test in other institutions, whose "reading"
is likely to be (and is expected to be) different, but no less legitimate.
An argument that the Senate possesses certain defects does not, in
any case, call for granting the president virtually complete control over
the Court's membership. Unlike executive branch appointees, Supreme
Court Justices are not subordinate to the president. Extreme Senate def-
erence to presidential nominations to the Court violates the principle of
separation of powers and defeats the purpose of the judiciary as an equal
and coordinate branch of government.8 1
The final argument against an aggressive, political role for the Sen-
ate focuses on the practical consequences for the Court's prestige and
independence. According to some critics, subjecting prospective Justices
to an intensive political or ideological review will reinforce a political
perception of the Court's role.82 No longer will judging and constitu-
tional interpretation be perceived as nonpolitical functions. The result-
ing loss in the Court's prestige and apolitical reputation will limit its
ability to make politically unpopular decisions, thus destroying its special
80. "[Plolitical and ideological compatibility has arguably been the controlling factor" in
presidential choice of Supreme Court nominees. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 6.
81. As Strauss and Sunstein also note, this is especially problematic with regard to separa-
tion of powers issues. As one of the parties in the conflict, the President "should not have the
dominant role in choosing the mediator." Strauss & Sunstein supra note 1, at 1493. See also
Biskupic, supra note 60, at 3026, describing the "two against one" situation that has resulted
from recent presidential dominance in the judicial selection process: the Court provides a
conservative interpretation of a Congressional statute (or defers to the executive branch's con-
servative interpretation), Congress reverses that interpretation by rewriting the statute, only to
face a presidential veto, which it narrowly fails to override. Two recent examples include
Congress's efforts to override the Court's Rust v. Sullivan decision, Il1 S.Ct. 1759 (1991), and
several of its employment discrimination decisions (most notably Wards Cove Packing v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)). In the later case, at least, Congress was ultimately successful
when a politically weakened President George Bush decided to sign the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
82. Strauss & Sunstein argued that the process is already political, "but only at one
end.... [P]art of what has politicized the process is the approach of recent Presidents." They
further assert that the solution is not a less deferential Senate, but a more aggressive one, in
that the president would be induced to take the Senate's role seriously, to deliberate, and to
compromise. The confirmation process would then become less political. Strauss & Sunstein,
supra note 1, at 1512-15.
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value in our constitutionally limited democracy.8 3
The weakness in this often-advanced argument is that it is not sup-
ported by empirical evidence. Survey research consistently reveals that
the public does not hold the Court in particularly high regard and does
not view it in exalted terms. Additionally, "[c]itizens know surprisingly
little about.., most decisions, and offer support contingent upon agree-
ment with specific public policies." 4 In short, "the dynamics of aggre-
gate support for the Court bear a remarkable resemblance to those for
Congress and the presidency. 185
Additionally, empirical research fails to support the assertion that
the Court indeed plays a countermajoritarian role. For example,
Thomas Marshall's analysis of public opinion and the Court's decisions
from the mid-1930s to 1986 led him to conclude that "[m]ost modem
Supreme Court rulings reflect public opinion, and overall, the modem
Court has been roughly as majoritarian as other American policy mak-
ers."86 In short, the Court's role of issuing unpopular decisions can
hardly be destroyed if it rarely performs such a role.
The notion that the president may pack the Court free of any signifi-
83. Richard D. Friedman, Balance Favoring Restraint, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 15, 18-19
(1987); BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 62, at 2, 345-49; Friedman, supra
note 37, at 84-87.
84. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confi-
dence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1209, 1210 (1986). See also David
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 790;
David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a National Poll-
cymaker, 5 L. & POL'Y Q. 405 (1983); Gregory Casey, Popular Perceptions of Supreme Court
Rulings, 4 AMER. POL. Q. 3 (1976); Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empiri-
cal Investigation, 8 L. & Soc'Y REv. 385 (1974); Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Public Views the
Supreme Court, in LAW, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 194 (Herbert Jacob, ed.
1967); Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Phillip E. Hammond, The Political Party Basis of Attitudes
Toward the Supreme Court, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 16 (1968); John H. Kessel, Public Perceptions
of the Supreme Court, 10 MIDWEST J. OF POL. SCI. 167 (1966); Walter F. Murphy and Joseph
Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequi-
sites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 L. & Soc'y REV. 357 (1968); Joseph
Tanenhaus & Walter F. Murphy, Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court: A Panel
Study, 43 J. POL. 24 (1981).
85. Caldeira, supra note 84, at 1223-24.
86. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT ix (1989) (em-
phasis added). David Barnum's empirical analysis similarly shows that the
countermajoritarian reputation of the Court is greatly exaggerated. David G. Barnam, The
Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision-Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47
J. POL. 652 (1985). The classic statement of this thesis comes from Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279
(1957).
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cant Senate check is patently undemocratic.8 7 Furthermore, it is flatly at
odds with the Framers' plan for balanced government and their prefer-
ence for stalemate over constitutional change that may be only weakly
supported and hurriedly or surreptitiously enacted.
Simply put, presidents do not possess the exclusive power or legiti-
macy to reshape our constitutional law as a by-product of their authority
to nominate Supreme Court Justices. Through Article V, the Framers
intended state and national legislators to share the power to enact consti-
tutional change. Given the modem day reliance on transformative ap-
pointments to achieve constitutional change, the power to make such
appointments must also be shared, requiring at a minimum, the deliber-
ate approval of a majority of Senators.
It might be argued that formal amendments and transformative ap-
pointments are two very different vehicles of constitutional change, each
perhaps necessitating different safeguards. For example, textual amend-
ments produce concrete, immediate, and long-term change, thereby justi-
fying Article V's demand for broad and enduring political support at
both the national and state level. Constitutional change implemented
through transformative appointments, on the other hand, occurs in a
slower and more subtle manner, especially due to the ability of precedent
to constrain the transformative ambitions of new appointees. Thus, there
are built-in safeguards, lessening the need for additional checks in the
form of Article V-type political support.
The problem with this argument is that it overstates the differences
between the two forms of constitutional change. Textual amendments
may not produce immediate and long-term change; they may not be
faithfully interpreted or they may simply be ignored. Both of these oc-
curred with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment."8 Additionally, pre-
cedent is not as powerful a constraint on judicial decisionmaking as is
87. The claim for such presidential authority is further weakened by low and unrepresent-
ative voter turnout and the difficulties in translating voter support into a popular mandate for
the president's appointment preferences.
88. The Court limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, generally in the
Slaughterhouse Cases U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and more particularly in eliminating racial
discrimination. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), it ruled that Congress had overstepped its authority in attempting to ban private
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In the late nineteenth century, the Court
permitted the states to enact Jim Crow laws mandating segregation, most notably in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court only occasionally struck down racially discrimina-
tory laws in the early part of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915) and Lau v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), both regarding voting rights. It was not
until the Warren Court of the 1950's and 1960's that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause was vigorously enforced.
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often assumed, particularly at the Supreme Court level. Certainly the
Warren and Rehnquist Courts are proof of that.8 9 Furthermore, the
Rehnquist Court has stated its belief that stare decisis is not an "inexora-
ble command," and that precedent is more important regarding property
and contract rights than individual rights.90 Five of the six Justices sup-
porting this position are Reagan and Bush appointees. 91 Finally, no
Supreme Court Justice has been removed from office through the im-
peachment process, 92 and only four of the Court's constitutional deci-
sions have been overruled by formal amendment.9 Considering the
relative youth of recent appointees, it is difficult to argue that constitu-
tional change through transformative appointments is less significant and
long lasting, and therefore less deserving of powerful political checks on
its development.
89. In the twentieth century, the Court has reversed prior rulings less than twice per year
(1.74 a year). During Earl Warren's tenure from 1953 to 1969, however, the Court overturned
45 precedents; most of these (34) were from the period from 1962 to 1969, in which the Court
struck down nearly five per year. O'BRIEN, supra note 4, at 11-12. The most significant rever-
sals occurred in the areas of race discrimination, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), reapportionment, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), school prayer, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and rights of the accused, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The Rehnquist Court has also been only weakly devoted to precedent. It has reversed 21
precedents from 1986 through the 1991-92 term. The pace of reversals has increased in the
last few years. For example, in Kennedy's first two terms, eight precedents were reversed. In
1990, when Souter joined the Court, seven reversals occurred. And in Thomas's first year, five
precedents were overturned. See O'BRIEN, supra note 46 at 12. Rehnquist Court reversals
have primarily occurred in the areas of school desegregation, Board of Education of Oklahoma
City v. Dowell, I11 S. Ct. 630 (1991), employment discrimination, Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), and abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Respect for precedent has been especially weak in cases involving the
rights of the accused, particularly habeas corpus, McCleskey v. Zant, I11 S. Ct. 1454 (1991);
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991), search and seizure, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.
Ct. 2382 (1991), and the admissibility of coerced confessions, Arizona v. Fulminante, I11 S.
Ct. 1246 (1991).
90. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-10 (1991) (reversing the precedent that a
crime victim's family may not testify at trial).
91. Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Payne, joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Souter.
92. Only one Supreme Court Justice, Samuel Chase, was impeached by the House of Rep-
resentatives. The Senate failed, however, to convict Chase by the required two-thirds vote, and
he served out his term.
93. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (overruled by the Eleventh Amendment);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (reversed by the Civil War Amendments (U.S.
CONST. AMEND. XIII-XV)); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (over-
ruled by the Sixteenth Amendment); and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (overruled
by the Twenty-sixth Amendment).
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Significant constitutional change achieved through transformative
appointments is not without precedent. Franklin Roosevelt used his nine
appointments to the Court to reverse longstanding precedent and, in ef-
fect, to eliminate from the Constitution its protection of both economic
"substantive due process" rights and state powers in relation to national
power. Thus, supporters of the recent efforts to transform the Court
might respond, looking to Franklin Roosevelt, "what's good for the
goose is good for the gander." Roosevelt, however, possessed far greater
legitimacy to lead a constitutional revolution through his appointments
than Reagan or Bush. Not only did President Roosevelt win reelection
decisively, he also led his party to overwhelming victories in Congress.
Furthermore, as Bruce Ackerman noted, Roosevelt and his Democratic
Congress proceeded to enact "pathbreaking statutory initiatives" which
were in turn subject to a "rich constitutional critique" by the Court.
Thus, by 1936,
a decisive majority of Americans had voted for the New Deal with
their eyes open to the practical and constitutional implications of
their collective decision. If ever there was a time that the People
could be said to have endorsed a sharp break with their constitu-
tional past, it was when Roosevelt and the Senate self-consciously
began to make transformative Supreme Court appointments.94
Support for Reagan and Bush's constitutional reform agenda was
much weaker than the broad popular endorsement of Roosevelt's New
Deal. Although Republicans did gain control of the Senate in 1980, their
numerical advantage was slim, and it vanished in 1986. Additionally, the
Congress balked at many of their legislative and constitutional proposals.
There simply has not been the sort of decisive popular and Congressional
approval for the Reagan-Bush agenda that could justify giving these
Presidents the type of transformative authority which Roosevelt so
clearly earned.95
94. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1174-75.
95. Strauss and Sunstein argued that it is current conditions "unique in our history"
which require a more active Senate role. Those conditions include "a large number of consec-
utive appointments by Presidents of one party during a period of divided government; the
danger of intellectual homogeneity on the current Court; overt ideological attacks by the Presi-
dent on the Court and the self-conscious screening of nominees to the Court by the executive
branch; the effective exclusion of the Senate from the selection of lower federal court judges;
and the increased importance of separation of powers questions." Strauss & Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 1502-03. I would argue that the need for a more aggressive Senate role is a general
and ongoing one. This will produce little conflict and great unity regarding Supreme Court
appointments when the President and Congress share a political consensus on the major issues
of the day, as in the case of Roosevelt. This should result in conflict and disunity with regard
to judicial appointments when there is not a consensus between the President and Congress, as
in the case of Presidents Reagan and Bush. (As the political commentator Russell Baker ar-
gued, "a politically divided Government is entitled to a politically divided Court." Supreme
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V. Restoring the Balance of Power
Presidential efforts to place on the Court individuals who share their
constitutional reform agendas are not in themselves problematic. In fact,
it is the motive for political dominance on the part of each branch which
is at the heart of, and indeed activates and makes effective, the system of
checks and balances. What makes such legitimate Court-packing efforts
troubling is the absence of an effective Congressional counterweight.96
How then might we strengthen the political checks on the president's
power to control the Court's membership and restore a proper balance of
power to the shaping of our constitutional future?
A. Strengthening the Senate's WMl and Power to Reject
The appointment of a new Justice represents a momentous occasion
in our constitutional development. Recent appointments have been espe-
cially significant, given the dramatic conservative shift currently under-
way in the Court. The Senate need not sit idly by while the president
attempts to pack the Court with ideological allies. It can enforce its in-
dependent assessment regarding our nation's proper constitutional
course by revitalizing its critical role in the confirmation process. The
Senate faces two obstacles in attempting to do so, however: first, the
twentieth century norm against political interference in the judiciary, and
second, the effectiveness of recent Court-packing tactics, exemplified by
the growing reliance on the "stealth" nominee to secure Senate
confirmation.
The judicial independence norm is enormously powerful and is vig-
orously protected by the bench, the bar, the legal academy, and selec-
tively, by politicians. Nevertheless, a principled case for ideologically
motivated rejection of Supreme Court nominees by the Senate can be and
must be made. Needless to say, the task of giving this principle the legiti-
mate status and permanence it deserves will prove enormously difficult.
A significant obstacle to Senate acceptance lies in the tendency of parti-
san supporters of individual nominees to themselves undermine the prin-
ciple of aggressive and politically-motivated Senate review. The judicial
andP.C. Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991, at A19.) Thus, there is no need to make the sort of
distinction which Strauss and Sunstein make; the Senate possesses the general authority to
evaluate Supreme Court nominees independently and aggressively, not only when special con-
ditions are present. To carve out an exception to a general rule of deference may weaken the
Senate's ability to respond aggressively when it desires to do so, and thus when the need to do
so arises.
96. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1494 ("Partisanship in Supreme Court nomi-
nations is indeed problematic. But one-sided partisanship-in which only the President, and
not the Senate, is allowed to be partisan-is much worse.").
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independence norm is far too handy a tool for Senators to employ to
secure confirmation of their politically-preferred candidate.
More particularly, how might the Senate seek to reassert its author-
ity to check the president's excessive Court-packing power? The Senate
may legitimately choose to enforce its authority not only to consent to
presidential nominees to the Court, but to advise the president, as the
Constitution permits.9 7 The Senate might legitimately warn the presi-
dent in advance of the requirements that subsequent nominees must
meet. Those requirements could be partisan or ideological in nature.
For example, it might promise rejection if the president fails to nominate
a Democrat or political moderate to fill subsequent vacancies.9" (Need-
less to say, the Senate must be prepared to follow through on such a
threat.)
In fact, the Senate has, on several occasions, chosen to exercise its
power to advise presidents in advance with regard to their Supreme
Court nominations. In 1869, Congress submitted a petition to President
Grant, signed by a majority of members in both the House and Senate,
urging him to nominate Edwin Stanton. Having seen his first nominee
rejected, Grant acceded to Congressional wishes. 99 Upon the retirement
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, President Hoover abandoned his desire to
nominate a "non-controversial western Republican" in response to the
Senate Judiciary Committee's stated preference for another progressive
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Borah's insistence
on Benjamin Cardozo.'"
As Strauss and Sunstein have persuasively argued, greater use of the
Senate's advisory function would rid the confirmation process of several
defects.01' To the degree that it is overly deferential and limits its evalua-
tion to mere "acceptability" ("whether the nominee has good character
and is not an extremist"1°2), the president has little incentive to compro-
97. Walter Dellinger suggested that the Senate put forward its own list of potential nomi-
nees. If it is an especially distinguished list, and the president chooses to ignore it, the burden
would shift to the president to defend his or her alternative, particularly in comparison to the
Senate's preferred candidate(s). "What's the Alternative?", supra note 1, at 42.
98. Strauss and Sunstein agree. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1512.
99. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 126.
100. According to Abraham, "[t]wenty-four hours before Hoover had indicated he would
announce his candidate publicly, he called for Borah. In an often-told, dramatic confrontation
between two proud men, the President, after discussing the vacancy generally, suddenly
handed Borah a list on which he had ranked those individuals he was considering for the
nomination in descending order of preference. The name at the bottom was that of Benjamin
N. Cardozo. Borah glanced at it and replied: 'Your list is all right, but you handed it to me
upside down.'" Id. at 202-03.
101. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1513-15.
102. Id. at 1514.
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mise or take Senate preferences into account. If the Senate were more
aggressive in both communicating its desires prior to the president's deci-
sion and evaluating the nominee after that decision, the president would
be induced to take the Senate's role and preferences more seriously and
to compromise. The result would be a more collaborative process, result-
ing in a consensus nominee.10 3
The confirmation hearings would then become less important, less
political, and less contentious. The nominee would no longer be exten-
sively "coached" by the Justice Department, the most frequent litigant
before the Court." The Senate would no longer need to resort to dis-
covering and then exaggerating isolated statements in order to character-
ize the nominee as "out of the mainstream."' 0' And nominees would no
longer be pressured to execute a "confirmation conversion," betraying
prior views or softening them in light of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee's alternate views.
In addition to advising and bargaining in advance with the presi-
dent, the Senate should more vigorously examine the nominee's pre-nom-
ination record. Previous remarks, writings, and official acts are "a far
more reliable indicator of the nominee's views," certainly as compared to
that which emerges from "public questioning of a well-coached nomi-
nee."' 1 6 This examination may also reduce the importance and orches-
trated nature of the confirmation hearings.' 07
Should the president choose to ignore Senate advisories and con-
tinue to present the Senate with nominees whose primary virtue is ano-
nymity, the Senate could quite simply refuse to confirm. It is certainly
within their authority to demand from nominees an explanation and de-
fense of their general views on current constitutional issues. In the ab-
sence of a public record to that effect, Senators can demand answers in
the hearing or even in advance via a formal questionnaire.
The Senate might also consider other, more "neutral" requirements
for a Supreme Court nominee. For example, it might impose an age re-
quirement, perhaps 55 years of age. This would limit presidents in their
search for a young nominee whose most attractive virtue is the absence of
any meaningful statements or actions with regard to the important issues
103. See Walter Dellinger's comments in "What's the Alternative?", supra note 1, at 42.
104. See Michael McConnell remarks in "What's the Alternative?", supra note 1, at 41.
105. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1514.
106. Id. at 1518, 1517.
107. See Dellinger remarks in "What's the Alternative?", supra note 1, at 41.
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of the day. 10 8
Similarly, the Senate might consider requiring that future nominees
possess a modicum of federal judicial experience, perhaps five years.
This too would go far toward reducing the likelihood of stealth nomi-
nees, who can legitimately, if unhelpfully, assert their open mindedness
and lack of firm views on current constitutional issues. The problem, of
course, is that such a requirement might excessively narrow the field of
candidates and exclude many who would prove to be exceptional Jus-
tices. As Henry Abraham pointed out,
[M]any of the most illustrious members of the Court were judi-
cially inexperienced. Among them were 8 of the 15 Chief Justices:
John Marshall, Roger B. Taney, Salmon P. Chase, Morrison R.
Waite, Melville W. Fuller, Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan F.
Stone, and Earl Warren; and such outstanding Associate Justices
as Joseph Story, Samuel F. Miller, Joseph P. Bradley, Louis D.
Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, and Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.109
Furthermore, the twelve Justices rated "great" in a 1970 survey of schol-
ars by Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky together possessed 40.5 years of
judicial experience prior to their appointments, with Holmes and Car-
dozo accounting for over half of those years (at twenty-eight). The four-
teen Justices rated as "failures," on the other hand had served a total of
64.5 years. 110 The reason, as Felix Frankfurter aptly pointed out, is that
the correlation between prior judicial experience and fitness for the
Supreme Court is zero. The significance of the greatest among the
Justices who had such experience, Holmes and Cardozo, derived
not from that judicial experience but from the fact that they were
Holmes and Cardozo. They were thinkers, and more particularly,
legal philosophers.1 1
A requirement for prior judicial experience is, in any case, not likely
to be passed. All previous congressional proposals for such a prerequisite
have failed. However, a requirement of a minimum of ten years of some
significant form of legislative, executive, or judicial experience would ac-
108. This would also address the concerns of those who worry about the lengthy terms and
increased impact on constitutional law that young Justices would have. It might also increase
the Court's turnover and its representativeness.
109. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 52 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Robert Kagan found
that of all U.S. Supreme Court Justices since 1930, only 24% had five years of judicial experi-
ence on any court. Robert A. Kagan, et al., American State Supreme Court Justices, 1900-
1970, AM. B. FOUND. Rrs. J. 371, 375 (1984).
110. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 348 n.5.
111. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
781, 795 (1975).
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complish the goal of preventing the stealth nominee without excessively
narrowing the field of potential candidates.
Given that transformative appointments recently have been em-
ployed as the exclusive way in which constitutional change is achieved,
another option might be to alter the confirmation process to resemble the
constitutional amendment process, for example, by requiring that future
nominees to the Court be approved by two-thirds of the Senate, rather
than a majority. Thus, as under Article V, significant constitutional
change would be approved by more than a simple majority of states, and
even a minority of states could prevent confirmation if their representa-
tives possessed serious doubts as to a nominee's desirability.
Professor Calvin Massey similarly argued for a two-thirds rule for
Senate confirmation. He believes such a change would dampen "exces-
sive partisan zeal" and "require the President to select a nominee with
broad public support."" 2 And although it might enhance the ability of
an interest group to block any nominee it opposed, a salutary effect might
result: "A premium would be placed on nominating a person whose ac-
complishments, constitutional philosophy, and professional stature is so
beyond cavil that even groups politically opposed to the nominee would
fail to arouse senatorial opposition.""' 3
Had such a rule been in effect, the 52 to 48 Senate vote in favor of
Clarence Thomas would have resulted in his rejection. Rehnquist too
would have failed to receive Senate approval for his elevation to the Chief
Justice seat in 1986 because he received only 65 confirmation votes.1 14
Due to changes in the dynamics of Senate confirmation voting, Rehn-
quist might also have been initially denied an associate justiceship in
1971, when he received only sixty-eight affirmative votes. 1 5 This propo-
sal would be effective only with regard to nominees whose statements or
actions have aroused controversy. It would not likely affect the confir-
mation of "stealth" nominees like Kennedy (who received no negative
votes) or Souter (who received only nine).1 1 6
112. Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1991).
113. Id. at 15.
114. As Massey noted, six other nominations would have failed as well (at no great loss to
the nation, he argued): Mahlon Pitney, Lucius Lamar, Stanley Matthews, Nathan Clifford,
John Catron, and Roger Taney (for Chief Justice). Id.
115. Other "close calls" were Charles Evans Hughes (for Chief Justice), Louis Brandeis,
and Melville Fuller (for Chief Justice). Ia at 15-16.
116. Thus, vigorous examination of the pre-nomination record or, in its absence, of the
nominee's views during the confirmation hearing remains critical.
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Also consistent with the intent of Article V, the institutional support
needed to approve constitutional change in the form of transformative
appointments could be broadened. Confirmation by the House or even a
delegation of state and party representatives could be added to insure
that Presidents who seek momentous constitutional change must earn
broad political support for that agenda.
The primary difficulty with such proposals is not their illegitimacy,
but their impracticality, given that they would require a constitutional
amendment."1 7 Extending the confirmation process in this manner
would lengthen the process and increase the resources necessary to evalu-
ate the nominee. That cost is outweighed, however, by the value of invig-
orating public debate and expanding the political support needed to
approve the President's transformative nominations.
B. Strengthening Congressional Checks
In addition to the Senate more aggressively asserting its constitu-
tional preferences in the confirmation process, Congress may also legiti-
mately enter the inter-branch competition for control of the Court.
While it possesses many tools to do so, altering the size of the Court is
the most effective and legitimate.
Restricting the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is too selective
and problematic a tool for the Congress to use. The conservative shift in
the Court's decisionmaking is simply too broad, covering too many dif-
ferent constitutional issues, for the Congress to withdraw each and every
issue on which it finds the Court's decisions troubling. Moreover, resolu-
tion of those constitutional issues would then be shifted to lower courts,
which are also subject to transformative appointments. There are legiti-
mate concerns regarding the resulting problems of uncertainty and insta-
bility in the law if important constitutional questions are left to
potentially diverse resolutions in the lower courts, or if they temporarily
remain static. 1 8
117. Requiring two-thirds approval by the Senate would probably require a constitutional
amendment. See Massey, supra note 112, at 14. The Senate could, however, as part of its
advisory role, agree not to confirm a nominee if he or she failed to win an advisory approval
vote from the House of Representatives or a delegation of national and state representatives.
118. For a discussion of such problems, see JEsSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE RULE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 52-55 (1980); EDWARD KEYNES, with RANDALL K. MILLER, THE
COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION (1989); Symposium, Congressional
Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982); Gerald Gunther, Congres-
sional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing De-
bate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
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Simply cancelling the Court's term (or terms) similarly does nothing
to alter the Court's composition or decisions. Such an action would only
slightly delay undesirable decisions and temporarily leave current consti-
tutional issues to the vicissitudes of lower courts.
Both the constitutional amendment and the impeachment processes
are cumbersome, crude, and ineffective tools for checking the Supreme
Court. They are, moreover, intended as direct checks on the Court and
its decisions, rather than as checks on presidential control of the Court,
the central concern here.
Congress can, of course, continue to limit the impact of the Court's
decisions through its discretionary legislative and funding power. It may
also attempt to overturn the Court's statutory interpretations with which
it disagrees, as it has with regard to employment discrimination.I19 That,
however, is not the only legitimate course that Congress may follow. In
fact, President Bush's veto strangle hold over the Congress12 0 only
strengthened the case for employing supplementary means to challenge
the president's control of the Court.
As in the nineteenth century, Congress may legitimately choose to
alter the size of the Court for political purposes. It may choose to limit
the size of the Court as vacancies occur, waiting until the election of a
president more to the liking of the Congressional majority. At that time,
it may expand the size of the Court if desired. This tool is effectively
directed to the goal of checking presidential dominance in packing the
Court. It also does not possess the disadvantages of other approaches,
like jurisdictional control, which freezes constitutional law doctrines or
places them in a temporary state of uncertainty.'12
There might be some concern that Congress may entirely usurp the
president's role in selecting new Justices. These concerns, however, are
unfounded. The president would retain the power to veto any attempt to
reduce the Court's size; thus, it would, in effect, require a two-thirds con-
gressional majority to limit a sitting president's power to continue mak-
ing appointments as vacancies occur. Furthermore, presidents would
also retain their initiating or nominating role in the selection process, a
significant source of power in modern times. Finally, Congress is un-
119. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress overturned twelve Supreme Court rulings.
Congress had failed to override Bush's veto of its earlier attempt at passing a Civil Rights Law
in 1990. See supra note 63.
120. President Bush had successfully vetoed 35 bills without being overridden by Congress.
On October 5, 1992, however, Congress overrode Bush's veto of a cable bill. Bush's Veto on
Cable TV is Overridden, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1992 at A2.
121. One possible but relatively insignificant problem would be tie votes, should the
Court's size remain at an even number.
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likely to overuse, and thus abuse, its power of altering the Court's size.
The need to do so would, in any case, be reduced if the Senate were to
adopt the more aggressive "advise and consent" role advocated here.
VI. Conclusion
More vigorous Senate review, expanding the political support
needed for confirmation, and particularly, congressional alteration of the
Court's size, will no doubt be seen as overly political and thus a danger-
ous assault on the independence of the Supreme Court. These proposals,
however, are not directed to subjecting existing members of the Court to
additional or more vigorous political checks. They are distinct from pro-
posals to make impeachment easier, to permit Congress to override the
Court's constitutional decisions by a two-thirds vote, or to subject Jus-
tices to term limits or a public or congressional retention vote.122 Such
reforms would indeed strike a significant blow to the ability of the Court
to evaluate statutory and constitutional challenges independently and
without fear of immediate political reprisal. What is being advocated
here, in contrast, is a stronger political check on the power of the presi-
dent to steer the Court in a particular ideological direction.
These proposals may indeed produce a significant inter-branch bat-
tle for control of the Court. This may even result in periods of political
stalemate over judicial appointments and the Court's future direction.
Should we as a nation arrive at a more certain consensus about the
Court's desired constitutional course, however, the temporary costs of
political acrimony and stalemate would be worthwhile.123
The Framers intended the Supreme Court to be a coordinate, rather
than a presidentially-subordinate, branch of government; it is not, nor
should it be, a mere agent of the president. Control over the selection of
its membership was intended to be shared between the president and Sen-
ate. In addition, the Framers quite rightly believed that constitutional
122. Progressives in Congress unsuccessfully sought to impose new constraints on the con-
servative Court at the turn of the twentieth century. They proposed that the Court could
strike down federal statutes only by a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority. They
would have also permitted Congress to overrule the Court's decisions by a two-thirds majority.
O'BRIEN, supra note 46, at 172. Monaghan proposed eliminating life tenure and instead pro-
viding that "no one be permitted to serve for more than some fixed and unrenewable term such
as fifteen or twenty years." Monaghan, supra note 78, at 1212. See also Philip D. Oliver,
Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms
for Members of the United States Supreme Court," 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799. For a conservative
view, see A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader
eds., 1981).
123. Simson came to the same conclusion. Simson, supra note 1, at 315-17. Friedman,
however, did not. Friedman, supra note 79, at 1316.
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change should be unusually difficult to achieve, requiring the support of a
super-majority consisting of both national and state representatives.
However, two developments-the rise of the judicial independence norm
and the recent increase in presidential power-have severely undermined
both principles.
The near monopoly of power the president has come to enjoy with
regard to Supreme Court appointments is troubling. It requires that we
seriously entertain measures to regain an appropriate balance of power
between the president and Congress in controlling the ideological direc-
tion of the Court. Such measures should increase the political support
needed for transformative appointments while leaving intact the capacity
of the Court to act as a co-equal branch.

